Free speech March 5, 2021


This article will be integrated into a much longer article: Jewish Geopolitical Master Plan


1860-65 The War Between the States

The Jews had long supported slave trade and slavery in the Southern American States. The Democratic Party therefore had Jewish support even if Andrew Jackson had destroyed the Jewish backed central bank. At the eve of the civil war the chairman of the Democratic Party was the Rothschild representative, August Belmont. The Confederacy was confident that the Jews would support secession or at least keep neutral. But then Jews stabbed the Confederacy in the back. Belmont and part of the Northern Democratic Party sided with the Union. Why? Because the Confederate Constitution was far too libertarian. It did protect slavery but otherwise it left hardly any role for the government. It made impossible major bank cartels or even major internal improvements that would have required the state to loan money from the banks and high taxes to finance those loans. Rothschilds could not accept that. Belmont wanted both slavery and big government which would take big loans from the banks and grant many monopolies and cartels to big businessmen.

The Jews were also suspicious of the conservative wave that was sweeping the West. It strongly defended the Confederacy and the new Empire of Mexico. In France, Austria and even in Britain conservatives and aristocrats did their best to stop the Jewish instigated egalitarianism and democracy. In culture conservatives such as Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin, Alfred Tennyson and Charles Dickens were also on the rise. The Jews were worried that the process of democratization would stop and on its place would develop aristocratic freedom where the kings and emperors would maintain their power but liberalize the economy and protect private property rights.

Alarmed by the betrayal of the Rothschilds the Confederacy appointed the Jew Judah Benjamin first the Secretary of War and then Secretary of State. Benjamin then travelled to Europe to persuade the Rothschilds and European powers to join the war on the side of the Confederacy. The Rothschilds were not enthusiastic unlike the British aristocracy led by the secretary of state Lord Russell who wanted to save the confederacy together with Napoleon III. Napoleon had already conquered Mexico and made Maximilian, the brother of the Austrian Emperor into an emperor of Mexico. But just as Britain and France were joining the war on the side of the Confederacy the Tsar of Russia stopped them. He sent his fleet to New York and San Francisco and saved the Union.

This was an enormous mistake though understandable. The politically isolated Tsar did gain an ally against the British Empire but in the long run he helped egalitarianism and modernism defeat conservatism. Ironic that the most conservative ruler saved the most modernist ruler. In time America would become the headquarters of the Jews, destroy the Tsar and help Bolsheviks take over Russia. The historian Allan Nevis (laudingly) explains how the Tsar changed the course of history:

It is hardly too much to say that the future of the world as we know it was at stake. A conflict between Great Britain and America would have crushed all hope of the mutual understanding and growing collaboration which led up to the practical alliance of 1917-18, and the outright alliance which began in 1941. …

Anglo-French intervention in the American conflict would probably have confirmed the splitting and consequent weakening of the United States; might have given French power in Mexico a long lease, with the ruin of the Monroe Doctrine; and would perhaps have led to the Northern conquest of Canada. The forces of political liberalism in the modern world would have received a disastrous setback. No battle, not Gettysburg, not the Wilderness, was more important than the context waged in the diplomatic arena and the forum of public opinion. The popular conception of this contest is at some points erroneous, and at a few grossly fallacious…. (Allan Nevins. War for the Union, II. 1960. p. 242)